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ABSTRACT 
This research aims to know, analyze, and formulate the independency indicators of 
independent institutions based on the concept of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) in 
advanced countries (United States and Europe). Also as an efforts to examine and see the 
extent to which independent institutions in Indonesia meet these indicators. This study focuses 
on KPK institution that are well known as one of independent institutions in Indonesia. Although 
in practice it often rise the controversy and resistance from many parties. The method used in 
this legal research is normative legal research, conducted through literature study or secondary 
data. Data consists of legal materials primary, secondary and tertiary, which are then 
processed descriptive-prescriptively. The research also uses several approaches such as 
legal, conceptual, and case approach.   
Keywords: Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs), Independence, KPK 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Compared to the United States, it can be argued that the term Independent State 
Institution (LNI) in the context of indonesia doesn’t have any meaningful justification. This is 
because until the present day there has not been a single article in the legislation which 
mention the term " independent state " definitively. in the early time of the UUD NRI 1945 (1945 
Constitution) formulation, the LNI has not yet found a place of discussion in the constitutional 
format.1 Even the term state institution itself has not been discussed. While the 1945 
Temporary Constitution (UUDS), used the term "state equipment" to define state institutions, 
but still has not specifically embedded the word "independent". The legitimacy for the 
establishment of independent state institution (LNI) just gained quite good sentiments only after 
the amendment of the 1945 Constitution.2 
The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), for example, in Article 3 of Law No. 30 
Year of 2002 regarding the Corruption Eradication Commission, states that the Corruption 
                                                             
1Zainal Arifin Mochtar, (2016), Lembaga Negara Independen: Dinamika Perkembangan dan Urgensi Penataannya 
Kembali Pasca-Amandemen Konstitusi, Jakarta, Rajawali Pers, page 5. 
2Ibid.,page 4-6. 
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Eradication Commission is a State institution which in carrying out its duties and authorities is 
independent and free from any influence of power. There is no formulation or further 
explanation regarding the independent aspect which has been mentioned. In fact, when the 
KPK translated the word 'independent' in the form of concrete actions against various 
corruption cases, controversy arose. Even by some parties it is often regarded as a form of 
arrogance by the superbody institution. 
Related to the phenomenon above, it becomes important and strategic to formulate 
measurable standards of independency for independent institutions. It is also interesting to 
examine the independency of independent institutions in Indonesia by by referring to the 
institutional concept and design in Europe and United States. This review will focus on the 
institutional and independency aspects of KPK as one of the independent state institutions in 
Indonesia. 
 
METHOD      
As a legal research, this research is a study of the concept of independency and 
institutional independence. Thus this research requires secondary data from literature studies. 
Based on this, this research is included in the type of normative research. From its nature, this 
research is descriptive-prscriptive. information from various aspects of the issues discussed in 
this research, this research uses several approaches, such as statutory approach, second, 
case approach, third, conceptual approach. 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) Indicators as Indicators of Independent State 
Institutions (LNI) in Indonesia 
In contrast to the existence of Independent Institutions that are still vague in Indonesia, 
the opposite can be found in the United States and Europe. Where independent state 
institutions or commonly called Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) are legally 
guaranteed by the legislation and even explicitly and limitatively mentioned. This exist for 
example in the provisions of The Paperwork Reduction Act44 (U.S.C. § 3502), which in point 
(5) states; 
”The term “independent regulatory agency” means the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the 
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Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Federal Maritime Commission, the Federal 
Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Mine Enforcement 
Safety and Health Review Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission, the Postal Regulatory Commission, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, the Office of Financial 
Research, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and any other similar agency 
designated by statute as a Federal independent regulatory agency or commission”.3 
 
Under these provisions, it can be known immediately that there are at least nineteen 
state institutions which explicitly designated as independent state institutions or IRAs. Thus 
exist a role model or blue print regarding what Independent Regulatory Agencies refer to in the 
context of the United States. In contrary, other institutions which are not included in the 
provisions or their institutional characteristics are not entirely the same, not included as the 
IRAs. 
The institutional design of IRAs or independent institution in the United States as 
proposed by Funk and Seamon, elaborate the characteristics of IRAs into the following 
elements; 
“These characteristics are (1) They are headed by multi-member groups, rather than 
a single agency head; (2) no more than a simple majority of these members may come 
from one political party; (3) the member of the group has fixed, staggered tems, so that 
their terms do not expire at the same time; and (4) they can only be removed from their 
position for “cause”, unlike most executive officials, who serve at the pleasure of the 
president.”4 
 
While Zainal Arifin Mochtar as he quoted fro, Milakovich and Gordon describes some 
of the characteristics of American and European independence Institution as follows; 
1) The institution has collegial leadership, so decisions are taken collectively. 
2) The members or the commissioners of the institution do not serve what the president 
desires. 
                                                             
3More see “The Paperwork of Reduction Act of 1980”. As quoted from https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/44/3502  
This regulation is essentially designed to lighten the administrative burden of government agencies in the private sector 
by delegating such authority to institutions outside the executive. All of these rules contain procedural requirements 
for such institutions in exercising their authority. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paperwork_Reduction_Act 
4William F. Funk dan Robert H. Seamon, 2001, Admisnistrative Law: Examples and Explanations, Apen Law & 
Bussiness, Printed in the United States of America, New York, page 7. 
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3) The  commissioner's term of office is usually definitive and long enough, for example 
14 years for the period of the Federal Reserve Board in America. 
4) The period of his position is "staggered". That means, every year each commissioner 
changes gradually and therefore, a president can not fully control the leadership of the 
relevant institutions. 
5) The number of members or commissioners is odd and decisions are made by a 
majority of the votes 
6) Membership of this institution usually maintains a representative partisan balance5. 
 
Thatcher, who analyzed the phenomenon of IRAs in Britain, France, Germany and 
Italy, drew the conclusion that there are three most important aspects of IRAs, namely the 
independence of elected officials, relationships with other administrative institutions 
(regulatees), and decision making process. He then explained that the independence of IRAs 
in practice can be seen from five indicators which are; 6 
1) Party Politicisation of appoinments, which means the greater politicization towards IRAs, 
the smaller its independence. it also affects greater oversight by elected officials (executive 
/ parliament). 
2) Departures (dismissal and resignation), ie the dismissal of IRAs members before the end 
of the term of office, the more frequent and rapid the dismissal, the lower the 
independence. 
3) The Tenure of IRA members, the longer their tenure, the greater their independence to the 
elected officials. 
4) The financial and staffing resources of the IRA, namely independence in terms of finance 
and resource management. 
5) The use of power to overturn the decisions of IRAs by elected politicians, ie the extent to 
which government officials are able to change the IRAs' decisions and policies. 
In addition to institutional characteristics, independence is also manifested in the 
characteristics of the authority possessed by the LNI. In the United States, there are many 
federal government bodies granted constitutional authority by legislatures (through law) to 
exercise power independently. These federal agencies practically carry out government 
                                                             
5Zainal Arifin Mochtar Husein, dkk., “Efektifitas Sistem Penyeleksian Pejabat Komisi Negara,” Final Report Penelitian, 
kemitraan partnership, 2008, page 11. 
6Mark Thatcher, “Independent Regulatory Agencies ini Europe”, downloaded from 
http://www.hec.edu/heccontent/download/3643/137514/version/2/file/Thatcher.pdf pada 18 mei 2016. 
  
 
      Volume 1, Issue 2, July 2018 : 82 - 94 
 
|  86 
 
The Independency of the Corruption Eradication Commission of 
the Republic of Indonesia (KPK RI) in Indicators of … 
 
 
functions by combining the legislative, executive and judicial powers. Regarding this quasi-
characteristic authority Funk and Seamon point out; 
“Specifically, an agency may have (1) the “quasi-legislative” power to adopt regulations 
that control people’s everyday conduct; (2) the executive power too enforce those 
regulatios and ther law that he agency is responsible for administering; and (3) the 
quasi-judicial power to apply those regulations and laws in individual cases.…some 
agencies not only combine powers resembling those of the three separate branches 
but also are somewhat insulated from presidential control, these are called 
“independent agencies”..”7 
In American and European countries, It's widely known that the state institutions which 
categorized as IRAs have regulatory authority or rule making function.8 This "self regulatory" 
characteristic is one of the elements of IRAs in beside the independency. 
Based on several concepts and models of independence initiated by the experts 
above, the authors intend to integrate these views in order to establish an ideal standard of 
independence according to the concept of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs). This 
independence standard will be used as an indicator in analyzing and examining the 
independence aspect of KPK institution which becomes the object of study in this research. 
Those indicators of independence are formal independence (formal independence) aspects 
which includes; 
1) Personnel independence, which consist of several aspects namely; 
a. Appointment and dismissal protection, ie mechanism for the appointment and 
dismissal of the institution's head under certain causation stipulated in law, thus not 
depending on the will of the president alone. 
b. Multi-member groups, namely the Leadership model that plural or collective leadership 
is composed of several people with decision making that is collegial 
c. Nonpartisan members; Leadership that is not majority and not dominated from one 
party or certain group 
d. Definitive terms of Office; namely the defined and definitive term of office of the 
member. 
2) Functional Independence, consisting of; 
a. Regulatory Authorities / Quasi Legislative power; namely having the authority of 
rulemaking or stipulating regulations in certain fields mandated and established by law. 
                                                             
7 William F. Funk dan Robert H. Seamon, Op.cit.,hlm. 23-24. 
8Fabrizio Gillardi, 2008, Delegation In The Regulatory State, Independent Regulatory Agencies In Western Europe,  
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, United Kingdom, page. 22. 
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b. Sanctioning Authorities / Quasi judicial power; ie whether an LNI has the authority to 
independently conduct investigations, prosecutions, imposition of sanctions or other 
authorities relating to judicial functions. 
3) Institutional Independence, which consisting of; 
a. Financial and Organizational management; namely whether the institution have 
independence in regulating and determining budget and managing internal affairs. 
b. External Relation; namely the mechanism of inter-institutional relations. The extent to 
which the LNI independent from influence and dependence with other institutions. 
In addition to the formal independence aspects above, the analysis will also be conducted 
towards the aspects of informal independence (de facto independence). This is done by 
applying case study approach to several aspects of the authority implementation and real 
condition of the institution. Some concepts from Mark Thatcher are used as indicator of analysis 
which are; 
1) Politicisation of appoinments, ie to see if there is politicization in terms of appointment 
of the leadership of the institution. 
2)  Departures (dismissal and resignation), ie how often the chairman of the institution 
stepped down from office before his term ended. 
3) The use of power to overturn the decisions of IRAs, ie the extent to which other 
institutions are able to change and influence the decisions or policies of the LNI. 
 
The Formal Independence  of Corruption Eradication Commision Republic Of Indonesia 
(KPK RI) 
Speaking about KPK as independent state institution (LNI), the aspect of formal 
independence are institutionalized and reflected in it’s legal provision which is Law no. 30 of 
year 2002 concerning the Commission for the Criminal Act of Corruption. Based on the formal 
independence indicator in the concept of Independent Regulatory Agencies or IRAs which are 
consisting of personnel independence, functional, and institutional aspects and their respective 
elements, the independence of KPK can be seen in the following table; 
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Tabel 1. 
Formal Independence of KPK 
Independency Aspect 
Elements of 
Independency 
Exist/ 
Not exist 
Legal provision 
 
 personel independence Appointment and 
dismissal protection 
Exist -Article 32 (1) The Chairman 
of the Corruption Eradication 
Commission shall cease or be 
dismissed for: a. die; b. 
termination of his office term;c. 
become a defendant for 
committing a criminal offense; 
d. remain unattended or can 
not perform its duties 
continuously for more than 3 
(three) months ; e. resign; or f. 
subject to sanctions under this 
Act.  
- Article 22 (2) The selection 
committee shall be established 
by the Corruption Eradication 
Commission. 
- Article 30 (1) The Chairman 
of the Corruption Eradication 
Commission shall be elected 
by the Congress of the 
Republic of Indonesia among 
the candidate proposed by the 
President of the Republic of 
Indonesia. 
 
Multi member 
groups 
Exist - Article 21 (1) The Corruption 
Eradication Commission shall 
consist of: the Chairman of the 
Corruption Eradication 
Commission consisting of 5 
(five) internal members. 
- Article 21 (5) The boards of 
Chairman of the Corruption 
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Eradication Commission shall 
work collectively. 
 
Nonpartisan 
member 
Exist - Article 29 To be eligible to be 
appointed as the Chairman of 
the Corruption Eradication 
Commission, one shall meet 
the following requirements: ... 
h. not being a member of a 
political party; i. releasing 
structural positions and / or 
other positions during 
membership of the Corruption 
Eradication Commission;  
 
Definitive terms of 
Office 
Exist - Article 34 The Chairman of 
the Corruption Eradication 
Commission shall hold the 
office for 4 (four) years and 
may be re-elected for one term 
only. 
 functional 
independence 
Regulatory 
Authorities/Quasi 
Legislative power 
Not Exist  
Sanctioning 
Authorities/Quasi 
judicial power 
Exist - Article 6 letter c: conduct 
investigation and prosecution 
of corruption; 
 
Institutional 
independence 
Financial and 
Organizational 
management 
Exist - Article 64 All fees required for 
the performance of the 
Commission's duties 
Corruption Eradication is 
charged to the Revenue 
Budget and State 
Expenditures. 
- Article 25 (1) The Corruption 
Eradication Commission: 1. 
establishing the organization's 
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policy and organization on the 
implementation of the duties 
and authorities of the 
KPKCorruption; 2. appoint and 
dismiss Head of Division, Head 
of Secretariat, Head of Sub-
Division, and officer in chargeto 
the Corruption Eradication 
Commission; 
 
External Relation Exist - Article 6 letter b: 
supervision on the authorized 
institution in corruption 
eradication; 
- Article 15 Point 2: The KPK 
shall prepare an annual report 
and submit it to the President 
of the Republic of Indonesia, 
the House of Representatives 
of the Republic of Indonesia, 
and the State Audit Board; 
 
 
Based on Table 1 it can be seen that the institutional design of the Corruption 
Eradication Commission as contained in the provisions of Law 30 of year 2002 almost fulfill all 
of formal independence indicators in the concept of IRAs. In terms of personnel independence, 
the KPK has met the mandatory requirement to be categorized as IRAs, referring to the 
mechanism of removal protection, ie the regulation concerning dismissal of 'certain causes' 
which does not depend on the 'political taste' of the President. Similarly, the collegial leadership 
model and the collective decision making process. 
Nevertheless, although in the selection of the commissioners involving a committee 
chosen by the KPK itself, the final decision to vote is still in the hands of the DPR (congress). 
Makes it a big potential for politicization towards the candidates for by the politician. In fact, 
congress will generally vote for the same candidate based on political preference, or at least 
as appropriate to their interests. The authority of the  Legislative Assembly to elect its own 
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public officials is still rising a debate in the context of constitutionality, since it is basically the 
authority of the President as the hig  hest executive officer or head of government to do so. 
In the aspect of functional independence, unfortunately the KPK has no authority in 
regulatory or rulemaking, which is one of the important aspects of IRAs. Its tasks, authorities 
and functions have been implemented based on existing regulations spread in Corruption act, 
KPK act and general provisions on criminal law procedure. However, basically quasi-judicial 
authority such as investigation, prosecution and supervision over other institutions in the case 
of corruption crime is sufficient to classify the KPK as an independent institution. 
The formal independence of the KPK also exists in terms of organizational and staffing 
that can independently managed by the it's own. Thing is also supported by the budget which 
allocated directly from the APBN (State Budget of income and expenditure). From a relational 
perspective to other institutions, the KPK's responsibility to provide an annual report to the 
President, including the House of Representatives (legislative branch) and also audited by 
BPK, doesn't indicating the dependence of KPK to other organs. in fact, it is necessary to 
ensure the institution's accountability to the public. It's also used as a control mechanism of the 
people's and the government in assessing KPK's performance in general. 
De facto independence of KPK 
It must be acknowledged that behind the institutional design of the Corruption 
Eradication Commission (KPK) which almost entirely in accordance with the concept of 
independent state institutions in the modern era (IRAs), its existence in Indonesia is the most 
often reaping conflict and being exposed to various problems. Since the Antasari Azhar 
Leadership, the term "lizard vs. crocodile" emerged as an analogy of the KPK conflict against 
the POLRI. The course of this conflict then not only happened once, but up to three times 
(Volume I, II, III in the language of the media) in every change of KPK management. The 
conflicts which occured varies from the issue of criminalization, to the investigation authority 
dispute between two institutions.9 
                                                             
9For example after the conflict of "lizard vs. crocodile" (volume I) in July 2012, the dispute between KPK vs. Police was 
reopened (Volume II), after KPK appointed former Chief of Police Traffic Corps Inspector Djoko Susilo as suspect of 
corruption case in SIM simulator project. In fact, before the Police Headquarters has stated, after investigating the 
internal investigation, did not find the element of corruption in the project, involving Djoko Susilo There was a dispute 
over the authority between the KPK and Police in investigating the corruption case. While in the third conflict, beginning 
with the determination of the suspect by the Commission against Komjen Budi Gunawan who is a candidate for Chief 
of Police. In the aftermath of this long feud, two KPK commissioners, Abraham Samad and Bambang Widjoyanto, 
were arrested by the Police Criminal Investigation Unit (Police Criminal Investigation Unit) each with a family card case 
and alleged witness briefing by BW when handling election dispute cases in the Constitutional Court. Automatically 
both are disabled as KPK leaders. While on the POLRI, Komjen Budi Gunawan canceled off as the Chief of Police 
was replaced by Baddrodin Haitian commander. See Tempo Magazine, "Sim Salabim SIM Simulator", 23-29 April 
2012 edition. 
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In practice, it can be concluded that in terms of the de facto independence,  KPK has 
great constraints in the aspect of The use of power to overturn the decisions of IRAs, as proved 
by the frequent intervention of POLRI in the exercise of the KPK's authority. Whereas 
specifically in corruption, the act regarding KPK has determined that it has supervision authority 
over other institutions. This agency's intervention has not been included from the alleged effort 
of systematic weakening against KPK by the legislative through revision of KPK and KUHAP 
regulation. For example with the proposal to revoke KPK's authority in recruiting independent 
investigators, and forming an executive council that acting as extension of the president's hand 
to control and oversee the performance of the KPK.10 The idea of revision on the Corruption 
Eradication Commission by legislative which is non-transparent and not disclose will affect the 
existence of KPK as law enforcer.11 Recently, the public was also preoccupied with the 
question of the right of inquiry submitted by the legislative  (DPR) against the KPK, which then 
led to the final decision by the Constitutional Court allowing such action. In the Departures 
(dismissal and resignation) indicators, the KPK was reaping very bad results. Throughout the 
KPK's record, there were several commissioners who were disbanded before their term ends. 
among them is the former KPK Commissioner Antasari Azhar, who was found guilty of a crime 
of premeditated murder.In KPK volume II, commissioners Chandra Hamzah and Bibit Waluyo 
also had dimissed in charge of the bribery case. In addition, there is also Abraham Samad, 
former chairman of the Corruption Eradication Commission in the third regime who was hit by 
a family card forgery case, and Bambang Widjoyanto who holds the status of a suspect in 
Bareskrim POLRI for the case of witnesses manipulation. Both are dismissed by the President, 
even though the provisions state that Commissioner  can only be dismissed if he/she has bear 
the status of a defendant. In the aspect of Politicisation of Appoinments, the discourse of the 
politicization of KPK began to emerge since the election of the KPK in 201612, where the names 
are predicted to be strong and have a good track record was not removed by the House. There 
are allegations that the House of Representatives tends to vote for one candidate with the 
same agenda and interests of the House.13 Particularly in the election of Basaria Panjaitan with 
the background of POLRI, it is considered that the public is not in line with the effort to 
independent KPK from the influence of POLRI. 
 
                                                             
10Lihat http://www.cnnindonesia.com/politik/20151007125208-32-83389/icjr-dewan-eksekutif-intervensi-pemerintah-
di-kpk/ lihat juga https://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2012/03/14/063390078/ada-upaya-dpr-terus-intervensi-kpk 
11Indriyanto Seno Adji, “Inisiatif Pelemahan atau Penguatan KPK?” article in Harian Suara Pembaruan, Friday, 12 
February 2016. 
12http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/12/18/07585511/.Komposisi.Pimpinan.Terpilih.KPK.Mengkhawatirkan. 
13See http://news.liputan6.com/read/2391399/abdullah-hehamahua-dpr-bakal-pilih-pimpinan-kpk-sesuai-selera 
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Tabel 2. 
 De facto Independence of KPK 
Independency Elements Description 
Politicisation of appoinments Politicisation by legislative in the selection 
process of  commissioner candidates. 
Departures (dismissal and resignation), Some of KPK Commissioners are dismissed 
before the office term due to criminal cases. 
The use of power to overturn the decisions 
of IRAs  
Intervention to KPK's authority by National Police 
Department, ressitance and some efforts to 
weakening the institution by the legislative. 
 
KPK commissioner selection has always been a problem. One of them was when the 
Antasari Azhar Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) candidate was reported to the 
Supervisory Section of the AGO on the alleged violation of the code of conduct of the 
prosecutors by a number of students who joined in the Anti-Manipulation Student Movement 
(Geram BUMN). In other cases, a pattern that threatens the independence of KPK's filling 
position has also been conducted by the President against the KPK, which at that time was 
short of commissioners. As known, the appointment of KPK commissioners as an independent 
institution requires them to be elected through selection mechanisms, but the President 
actually issues a PERPPU which in principle enlarges the president's authority to appoint KPK 
commissioners. If the recruitment mechanism is not corrected immediately, the politicization of 
KPK commissioner elections will clearly affect the level of independence as an LNI. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the description above, the independence of an independent institution or LNI 
can be divided by two indicators. First, the formal independency which includes aspects of 
institutional design. This formal indicator can also be used as a reference or blueprint for the 
future establishment of independent institutions in Indonesia. Secondly, non-formal or de facto 
independence, which used as indicators in practice, such as politicization election, and external 
resistance. In the context of the KPK, there has been no correspondence between the formal 
independence aspect and the implementation according to de facto independence.. The KPK's 
institutional design, which is formally very independent, yet has not been able to make the KPK 
truly independent in its implementation level. By that time, the government and the public must 
be more consistent and have greater commitment regarding to the position and guarantee the 
independence of KPK in the Indonesian state administration system. 
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